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LATIN AMERICA
FUJIMORI EXTRADITION TO PERU
Former Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori was arrested in Santiago, Chile, on
November 7, 2005. His arrest has been fol-
lowed by an emphatic demand that the
Chilean authorities expedite his extradition
to Peru, where he is suspected of numerous
human rights violations. These human
rights violations include extrajudicial execu-
tions, as well as the use of extortion and
intimidation as a means to control the
Peruvian judiciary and other state institu-
tions. The convictions of 2,500 individuals
by domestic anti-terrorism courts in the
1990s without protection of their due
process rights are evidence of Fujimori’s con-
trol over the judiciary. 
Fujimori, who was the president of Peru
from 1990-2000, fled to Japan after his gov-
ernment collapsed in the face of a corruption
scandal. According to Human Rights
Watch, Fujimori is accused, among other
things, of providing members of his death
squad (the Colina Group) with severance
payments of $15 million for “services to the
nation.” This and other mounting evidence
of moral and political improprieties were
enough to cripple the former President’s
administration. He now faces criminal
charges of corruption and human rights
abuses, including homicide, acts of torture,
and forced disappearances.
After Fujimori’s regime collapsed, special
prosecutors initiated investigations to ascer-
tain the extent of the human rights abuses
committed by his government. Human
Rights Watch has reported that there are
nearly 1,500 individuals being prosecuted
for acts of corruption allegedly committed
under the regime, including 40 members of
the Colina Group. The charges against
Fujimori include the extrajudicial execution
of 15 people in 1991, as well as the forced
disappearance and murder of nine students
and a teacher from La Cantuta University in
July 1992.
The potential prosecution of Fujimori for
these crimes comes as a result of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ finding
that the amnesty law that had blocked the ex-
president’s prosecution for years was a viola-
tion of the American Convention on Human
Rights. In September 2001 the Inter-
American Court determined that the 1995
law, which provided impunity for human
rights abuses committed by the military,
police, and civilian personnel in the struggle
against the Maoist insurgency, was invalid
because it lacked judicial effect and impeded
the reparations process. 
On August 28, 2001, the Peruvian
Congress also addressed the matter of
Fujimori’s impunity and stripped him of
protections meant to exempt all former
heads of state from punishment. By lifting
the amnesty that Fujimori had established
during his presidency, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has helped Peru
begin the reparations process by reestablish-
ing the legitimacy of the judiciary, increasing
transparency, and ultimately providing the
public with the tools required to seek justice
through peaceful means.
The Chilean Supreme Court must now
determine whether Peru has met all the nec-
essary requirements in its request for the ex-
president’s extradition. In the past, Chilean
courts have found insufficient grounds to
grant Peruvian extradition requests concern-
ing cases linked to the Fujimori regime. José
Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director of the
Americas Division of Human Rights Watch,
stated, “The Chilean judiciary did the right
thing by ordering Fujimori’s arrest.… Now
it needs to determine whether his days of
evading justice are over.” 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN
CENTRAL AMERICA
Like much of the rest of the world,
Central American nations struggle to find
solutions to various human rights abuses.
Among these Central American nations, El
Salvador and Guatemala stand out with
respect to their high rates of recorded vio-
lence against women and their government’s
weak response to this phenomenon. 
Human rights groups have expressed
concern with the lack of thorough investiga-
tions of the murder of women in El
Salvador, as well as the treatment of the vic-
tims’ families upon reporting these crimes.
Of the last 20 cases of women and girls who
were sexually abused and then brutally mur-
dered in El Salvador, only three have result-
ed in the prosecution and conviction of the
responsible parties. Amnesty International
compared the methods used to carry out
these murders “to those used by the death
squads in the 1970s to terrorize the popula-
tion.” According to the organization, the
government of El Salvador fails to exercise
due diligence by preventing, investigating,
and punishing sexual and gender-based vio-
lence, whether perpetrated by state officials
or non-state actors. Further, the state has not
fulfilled its duty to protect the rights of the
victims and to provide them, or their rela-
tives, with an appropriate and effective rem-
edy. This has contributed to “a climate of
fear and general mistrust in the justice sys-
tem,” Amnesty International noted.
Attempts by family members to report
disappearances, rapes, and murders are often
disregarded and at times met with hostility.
These reactions serve only to violate the
trust of the public and hinder the investiga-
tive process as a whole. The judicial system
of El Salvador cannot perform its legal and
moral obligations if crimes are not reported.
Amnesty International has noted, “The gov-
ernment of El Salvador has an outstanding
debt to the women of this country, a debt
that can only be repaid with justice.” 
The problem is also prevalent in
Guatemala, where violence against women
was most pronounced during the 36-year
internal armed conflict that ended with the
signing of the UN-brokered Peace Accords in
1996. Approximately one quarter of the con-
flict’s 200,000 victims of disappearances or
extrajudicial executions were women. This
result is not surprising considering that rape
and sexual abuse were integral in the
Guatemalan military’s counter-insurgency
plan. By sexually abusing women, the mili-
tary hoped it would be able to create an
atmosphere of fear and intimidation that
would allow it to control the population
more easily. The psychological effects of these
past abuses, coupled with the state’s failure to
hold the perpetrators accountable, have been
overwhelmingly detrimental to social
progress in Guatemala. As a result of these
government shortcomings, there is signifi-
cant public distrust of the judicial system and
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its ability to achieve justice, which has weak-
ened the rule of law within the country. 
Amnesty International has issued reports
concerning the systemic flaws in the mecha-
nisms used by the Guatemalan government to
protect women from violent crimes. In its lat-
est report, Amnesty stated that “[t]he State’s
failure to bring to justice those responsible for
the atrocities committed during the internal
armed conflict or to provide reparations to
the victims and their families has left a terri-
ble legacy.” Moreover, it has become increas-
ingly apparent that this legacy is fueling the
ongoing sexual violence and discrimination
against women in Guatemala that remains
today. The nation’s youth find themselves in
an environment that does not regularly pun-
ish these crimes, which in turn sends the mes-
sage that as long as you are male the scales of
justice are tipped in your favor.
Although the government has taken
some steps to address this issue, including
the ratification of international human
rights treaties and the introduction of laws
and state institutions aimed at promoting
the rights of women, their effect has been
minimal. These mechanisms have failed in
their attempts primarily due to a lack of
resources, such as personnel and equipment,
and a lack of political will. The UN Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
found that “the Women’s Office of the
Ministerio Público and the special unit of
the PNC (Polícia Nacional Civil) reported
that 40% of the cases are archived and never
investigated.” This special unit of the PNC
functions with 20 investigators divided into
five groups. Each investigator estimates that
they have a minimum of 20 cases pending,
many of which will never have their day in
court. 
Due to a lack of cooperation between
government agencies and institutions, a
majority of the cases that are filed never
make it beyond the initial investigation
stage. According to the office of the Special
Prosecutor for Crimes against Women,
only one out of more than 150 cases
received by its office for investigation has
resulted in a criminal conviction. The
Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office esti-
mates that only nine percent of cases have
actually been investigated. Of the cases that
reach the investigation stage, very few are
allotted sufficient resources to conduct a
thorough investigation, according to
Human Rights Watch. 
The international human rights commu-
nity has acknowledged the desperate state of
women’s rights in Latin American countries.
Women are marginalized and have limited
opportunities to remedy the situation
through their country’s judicial systems.
Human rights defenders are calling for the
establishment of effective oversight and
accountability mechanisms to remedy the
many protection-based problems within these
governments. Only after these systems are in
place and can adequately protect women’s
rights will the societal pressures that perpetu-
ate the problem begin to be challenged.
AFRICA
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS IN
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa’s Constitutional Court, the
country’s highest court, ruled on December
1, 2005, that same-sex marriages must be
given the same legal status as those between
men and women. The Court stayed its rul-
ing for one year, during which time the
Parliament is supposed to amend the
Marriage Act of 1961 to make its provisions
gender-neutral. The Parliament is expected
to comply with the Court’s decision. If the
Parliament fails to make these changes, the
words “or spouse” will be added automati-
cally to the Act after the words “or hus-
band.” The Home Affairs Department is
expected to use this time to draft recommen-
dations to its Minister on practical steps
needed to implement the law.
The decision came in response to a gov-
ernment appeal after the national Supreme
Court of Appeal affirmed the marriage of a
lesbian couple. The government argued that
the Supreme Court had overstepped its
bounds and infringed on the Parliament’s
authority to make laws. The Constitutional
Court, however, stated that the common
law’s refusal to grant legal rights to same-sex
couples violated the constitutional protec-
tion of equal rights. The ruling was unani-
mous except for one justice who argued that
the decision should take effect immediately.
Some South African gay-rights activists
expressed frustration with the year-long
delay in the decision’s implementation.
Others, however, have applauded the ruling
as a major step forward. Indeed, the ruling
comes after a series of smaller victories for
gay rights were secured in the wake of South
Africa’s constitutional ban against discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation. In
1998, for example, the Constitutional Court
struck down sodomy as an offense, and one
year later it approved permanent residency
for foreign partners of gay citizens. In 2002
the Court gave homosexual partners in a
committed relationship the same financial
status as married heterosexual couples, and
ruled that homosexual couples could adopt
children. One year later it also ruled that
children born to same-sex couples through
artificial insemination were legitimate.
South Africa is only the fifth country to rec-
ognize same-sex unions as equal to those of
heterosexual couples.
MASS GRAVES IN NAMIBIA
Mass graves were discovered in Namibia
along its northern border with Angola in
November. Conflicting reports put the total
number of bodies uncovered between seven
and eleven. Officials link the graves to a nine-
day war fought in 1989 between the South
West African People’s Association (SWAPO)
and the former South African Defense Forces
(SADF) during Angola’s struggle for
independence from South Africa. Troops of
the armed branch of the SWAPO party, the
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
(PLAN), reportedly crossed into Namibia
from Angola on March 31, 1989, the night
before Angola’s year of transition to
independence began. Although over 300
people were reportedly killed in the clash,
which threatened the peace process at the
time, diplomatic negotiations eventually
smoothed over the incident. Namibia became
an independent country in 1990. Subse-
quently, SWAPO won the Namibian elections
and has remained in power ever since.
Based on their uniforms, the dead appear
to be members of PLAN. The same type of
cloth that the former apartheid regime used
to murder individuals by suffocation was
found in the graves and is further evidence
that the SADF may be responsible for the
killing. A road worker discovered the first
grave on November 9, 2005, and army units
were sent to search for additional graves in the
area. Government appeals for information
have since led to further discoveries. 
Upon its election SWAPO instituted a
national reconciliation policy and signed an
agreement with South Africa’s then apartheid
government that it would not take legal
action against those responsible for commit-
ting atrocities during the liberation war.
Namibia’s current government remains com-
mitted to this policy and has called for former
fighters to reveal both the sites of additional
graves and information regarding the identifi-
cation of bodies without fear of retribution.
Critics of the reconciliation policy, however,
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note that it has prevented families from learn-
ing the truth about their loved ones and mov-
ing toward forgiveness. Namibia’s National
Society for Human Rights (NSHR) and other
NGOs have called for a truth and reconcilia-
tion commission (TRC) similar to South
Africa’s to investigate human rights violations
committed by both sides during Namibia’s
struggle for independence. NSHR has re-
launched its appeal for a TRC in response to
the discovery of the graves.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN KENYA
Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution
on November 21, 2005. According to the
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), 57
percent of voters voted against the constitu-
tion. Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and his
National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK)
had urged support for the document, but
stated in a televised address that his govern-
ment would respect the people’s decision.
The issue has proven divisive, particularly
because the President’s Roads and Public
Works Minister and five other cabinet min-
isters opposed the referendum.
Opponents of the proposed constitution
feared that it gave too much power to the
President. They preferred an earlier draft,
which would have shared executive power
between the President and the newly-created
post of Prime Minister. Other issues that
were under dispute included the devolution
of powers, presidential election procedures,
and cabinet appointments.
The rejected draft would have replaced
Kenya’s current constitution, which was
written in London after Kenya’s independ-
ence from Great Britian in 1963. The cur-
rent constitution was conceived by Kenyan
nationalists with little input from the
Kenyan people. The constitutional re-writ-
ing process began with the Constitution of
Kenya Review Act of 1997, which aimed to
decrease presidential powers and decentral-
ize the government, and continued in 2000,
when the Constitution of Kenya Review
Commission (Commission) was appointed
to collect citizen input on the revisions. The
Commission’s findings showed a popular
desire to limit the control of Kenya’s heads of
state due to abuses by former Presidents
Daniel arap Moi and Jomo Kenyatta. In
2003 and 2004, delegates from government
and civil society met at the National
Constitutional Conference. The resulting
“Bomas Draft” included presidential power
sharing and addressed other rights-based
issues, but it caused strong disagreement
among the delegates. Attempts at consensus
led to further drafts, which culminated in
November’s failed ratification. The failed
ratification signifies that the current consti-
tution will remain in force.
Despite some mild violence leading up to
the vote, the day of the referendum was
largely peaceful. Nearly 20,000 local and
150 foreign observers, as well as 60,000
security personnel, oversaw the process.
During the announcement of the referen-
dum results, ECK Chairman Samuel
Kivuitu urged the public to push for further
constitutional review, stating that “[i]t is
imperative that we continue to strive for a
better constitution, one that seeks to unite
us, one that recognizes that the power to
govern rests on the people.”
MIDDLE EAST
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE HAGUE
DECIDES ON IRAQ
The District Court for the Hague decid-
ed the first verdict addressing crimes against
humanity committed against ethnic Kurds
in Iraq. On December 23, 2005, Presiding
Judge Roel van Rossum found Dutch busi-
nessman Frans van Anraat guilty of complic-
ity in war crimes. The Court sentenced van
Anraat to 15 years in prison for selling
chemical weapons components to the Iraqi
government between 1980 and 1988.
Prosecutor Fred Teeven contended that these
materials were used by the Saddam Hussein
regime in a 1988 chemical attack on the vil-
lage of Halabja, which killed 5,000 Kurds.
Halabja was among the 40 Kurdish vil-
lages used by the Hussein regime as “testing
grounds” for chemical weapons in 1987 and
1988. According to the U.S. Department of
State, the attacks on Halabja blinded,
maimed, disfigured, or otherwise debilitated
more than 10,000 people. The Court found
that van Anraat “facilitated the attacks” by
supplying the regime with thiodiglycol,
which he knew or should have known would
be used in the production of mustard gas.
Office records from van Anraat’s firm indi-
cate that he sold over 1,000 tons of
thiodiglycol to the Iraqi government. Teeven
argued that these shipments were likely the
source of the 800 tons of thiodiglycol used
to manufacture the weapons in the Halabja
attack. Judge van Rossum found that the
Hussein regime’s chemical weapons program
depended on the materials sold by van
Anraat and declared him guilty of multiple
counts of complicity in war crimes, violating
the laws and customs of war, and causing
death and serious bodily harm to the whole
or entire Kurdish population.
Van Anraat claimed that he was unaware
that the thiodiglycol was intended for use in
chemical weapons. The prosecution coun-
tered that van Anraat and his business part-
ner Hisjiro Tanaka went to great lengths to
circumvent bans imposed on the export of
chemical weapons components by mislabel-
ing packages and falsifying shipment docu-
mentation. Defense lawyers argued that van
Anraat violated only economic guidelines.
Tanaka responded that chemical manufac-
turers told van Anraat that thiodiglycol is
used in chemical weapons production.
Witness statements that were obtained from
the prosecution’s investigations in numerous
countries suggested that van Anraat could
have learned about Iraq’s chemical weapons
campaign against the Kurds as early as 1984.
Before finding van Anraat guilty of com-
plicity in war crimes, the court first considered
whether the 1988 attack on Halabja constitut-
ed genocide. The 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention), to which
Iraq became a party in 1959, defines genocide
as “acts committed with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.” Teeven argued that Hussein
and former Defense Minister Ali Hassan al-
Majid “were both closely involved in policies
regarding the production and use of poison
gas, the Anfal campaign [against the Kurds],
and the attack on Halabja.” As evidence of
genocidal intent, the prosecution cited al-
Majid’s anti-Kurd radio campaign in 1988,
including his statements that people in the
Kurdish areas “have to be destroyed … [and]
must have their heads shot off,” and that he
would “attack them with chemical weapons
and kill them all.” The Court found that the
Iraqi Kurds constitute an ethnic group accord-
ing to the Genocide Convention, and that
“the court has no other conclusion than that
these attacks were committed with the intent
to destroy the Kurdish population of Iraq.”
The court, however, acquitted van Anraat of
genocide charges upon finding that he was not
aware of the genocidal intentions of the Iraqi
regime when he sold the ingredients for poi-
son gas, and that the last shipment of thiogly-
dicol from van Anraat’s firm reached Iraq prior
to the attack on Halabja.
Hussein and al-Majid, named unindicted
co-conspirators in van Anraat’s case, face
trial by the Iraqi High Criminal Court (for-
merly the Iraqi Special Tribunal). The
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regime is accused of killing over 180,000
Kurds. It is believed that the tribunal prose-
cution plans to address the Halabja attack,
but it is doubtful that the Dutch Court’s
findings on genocide will play a role in the
prosecution. Although the Iraqi High
Criminal Court is not required to take into
account the judicial reasoning of the Dutch
Court, the finding of genocide in the van
Anraat case remains noteworthy as the first
legal recognition of genocide against Kurds
by the Hussein regime.
Although the Hague court sentenced van
Anraat to 15 years in prison, Judge van
Rossum noted that this sentence was insuffi-
cient because his economic activities “made
possible a large number of attacks on
defenseless civilians.” Van Anraat plans to
appeal his sentence. The court also awarded
10,000 euros in symbolic damages — the
maximum amount of damages awarded to
civil parties in criminal cases — to each of
the 15 survivors of the Halabja attacks who
joined the case. Additional victims are
expected to demand higher damages in a
civil case following this verdict.
EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES USE EXCESSIVE
FORCE IN POLICE RAID
Between 25 and 28 Sudanese refugees
were killed when police forcibly disbanded a
continuous three-month sit-in outside
United Nations offices in Cairo. Over 3,000
Sudanese demonstrators were gathered to
protest grievances with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The Egyptian government
detained 2,174 Sudanese refugees following
the assault and has since announced plans to
deport 654 of them to the Sudan.
Over 4,000 Egyptian police surrounded
the camp on December 30, 2005, at 5:00
A.M., and ordered protesters to leave the
premises. After a five-hour standoff, police
fired water cannons into the crowd and
began indiscriminately beating protesters.
Over 2,000 of the refugees were arrested and
taken to four detention centers, including a
sealed military training camp in Tora Balad,
20 miles south of Cairo. Tora Balad prison
officials admitted doctors to treat the
detainees’ injuries, but deteriorating sanitary
conditions and severe crowding have raised
concerns. The Egyptian foreign ministry
offered no apology for the deaths and
stressed that the operation was necessary to
disband the illegal protest.
Human rights organizations and local
political parties criticized Egyptian authori-
ties for their disproportionate use of force
against protesters. The United Nations Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
states that “law enforcement officials may
use force only when strictly necessary and to
the extent required for the performance of
their duty.” The Code’s provisions are based
on treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the UN Convention Against Torture, to
which Egypt is a party. Human rights organ-
izations have argued that the early hour of
the assault and the violent nature of the
police tactics were unwarranted.
The United Nations Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms states that law
enforcement officials “shall, as far as possi-
ble, apply non-violent means before resort-
ing to the use of force” and may use force
“only if other means remain ineffective.”
When the use of force is unavoidable, law
enforcement officials must “exercise restraint
in such use and act in proportion to the seri-
ousness of the offence.” Joe Stork, Deputy
Director of Human Rights Watch’s Middle
East division, noted that “the high loss of life
suggests the police acted with extreme bru-
tality.” The Egyptian government responded
that the protestors incited violence by using
broken bottles as weapons against police
officers. Egyptian authorities also maintain
that the refugees who were killed died in a
“stampede” caused by their fellow protestors.
Critics note, however, that indiscriminate
beatings and the use of water cannons were
likely the direct cause of most of the deaths.
In a letter dated January 4, 2006,
Human Rights Watch called for an inde-
pendent investigation examining all levels of
the police command, including the role of
Interior Minister Habib al-’Adli. President
Mubarak responded that the Attorney
General would examine the incident.
Human Rights Watch argued, however, that
a review by the Attorney General would not
meet the objectivity requirement of an inde-
pendent commission, particularly in light of
statements from government officials blam-
ing protestors for provoking violence and
directly or indirectly causing injuries.
“Previous government inquiries into police
violence against Egyptian protestors have
consistently exonerated Interior Ministry
officials,” added Bill Frelick, Deputy
Director of Human Rights Watch’s Refugee
Policy Program. He noted that if witnesses
and victims were deported before they could
give statements, the lack of testimony would
render the investigation “an empty gesture.”
The larger issue is what will become of the
detained protestors who face the possibility of
deportation to Sudan. There are approxi-
mately 30,000 registered Sudanese refugees
living in Egypt, and the unofficial migrant
population is estimated in excess of two mil-
lion individuals. The 25 percent unemploy-
ment rate has fueled local hostilities as
refugees and Egyptians compete for jobs, and
many refugees claim to face harassment and
discrimination. Although many protesters
indicated an unwillingness to return to
Sudan, most are discontent with their quality
of life in Egypt and desire to be resettled in a
third country. UNHCR has facilitated reset-
tlement of several Sudanese families over the
course of the 21-year civil war, primarily in
the United States, Britain, and Australia.
Since the signing of the North-South Peace
Accord in January 2005, however, the
Egyptian government has been considering
the option of returning refugees to Sudan.
Despite the end of the civil war, many
human rights organizations maintain that it
is not yet safe for refugees to return. Article
33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)
prohibits the return or expulsion of a refugee
to any place “where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a partic-
ular social group or political opinion.”
Human rights organizations have argued
that returnees may be identified as “traitors”
and persecuted for their initial flight. Those
who took part in the protest may also be per-
secuted for engaging in political activities
overseas. The UNHCR Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status states that “[a] person may
become a refugee ‘sur place’ as a result of his
own actions, such as associating with
refugees already recognized, or expressing his
political views in his country of residence.”
Local human rights advocates have argued
that deporting protesters before determining
whether they are refugees sur place would
violate the Refugee Convention.
Astrid van Genderen Stort, a spokesper-
son for UNHCR in Cairo, addressed these
concerns in a January 3, 2006, press confer-
ence. “We have received assurances that
nobody is forced to return to Sudan,” he
said. Despite this statement from UNHCR,
Sudanese Major General Beshir Ahmed
Beshir told Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram
on January 2, 2006, that the Egyptian gov-
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ernment planned to deport at least 650
Sudanese refugees. On January 4, 2006,
UNHCR indicated that approximately
1,500 of the protesters had been released. 
The Egyptian government delayed the first
round of deportations scheduled for January 5,
2006, for 72 hours in response to requests
from UNHCR that it be allowed to identify
the refugees and asylum-seekers among the
detained refugees. Human rights organiza-
tions, however, expressed concern that three
days was not a sufficient amount of time for
UNHCR to make such determinations.
Refugee advocates also argued that many
refugees lost their documents, including pass-
ports, refugee identification cards, and asylum-
seekers’ registration cards, in the course of the
police raid. Without those documents,
Egyptian officials could not be certain that
they were only deporting individuals whose
applications for asylum had been denied. In
addition, the police raid separated family
members from one another, and many families
have not yet been reunited. Individuals who
have derivative refugee status through a family
member may be among those targeted for
deportation. Refugees separated from their
dependants are also potential deportees.
Human rights organizations have requested
that asylum applications be reviewed de novo
and that families be reunited before any depor-
tations take place. 
General Beshir, who chairs the receiving
committee for deportees in Sudan, said he
expected a group of 13 protesters to arrive in
Khartoum on January 9, 2006. As of January
11, 2006, however, UNHCR indicated that no
refugees had been deported and an additional
164 refugees had been released. UNHCR has
requested a one-month extension to complete
interviews with those still detained.
ASIA
CHINA’S HUKOU SYSTEM AND
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS
At the end of October 2005, the govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) announced plans to abolish the hukou
household registration system. The PRC gov-
ernment implemented the hukou system in
the 1950s, which requires Chinese citizens to
register either as “non-agricultural” (urban)
or “agricultural” (rural) residents. In effect,
the hukou system prevents equal access to
social security, housing, healthcare, educa-
tion, work benefits, and other essential
resources for rural residents and those who
migrate from the countryside to cities.  
The hukou system is embedded in
decades of social, economic, and political
control exercised by China’s central govern-
ment. By requiring citizens to register as
urban or rural residents, the system origi-
nally sought to address issues of resource
distribution, migration control, and the
monitoring of targeted groups of people. It
also restricted rural residents’ ability to trav-
el freely to urban areas to find employment
and erected numerous obstacles for rural
migrants seeking to change their hukou sta-
tus. Over the past few decades, changes in
China’s economic landscape have prompted
the government to reform the system to
allow some migrants to hold temporary res-
idence permits. Such reforms have brought
more rural residents to urban areas to satis-
fy increasing labor demand in the cities.
Even without temporary or permanent resi-
dence permits, there are millions of
migrants working in the cities. 
China’s 140 million migrant population,
about one-third of its total urban popula-
tion, represents the majority of those work-
ing in factories and mines. They face signif-
icant barriers to becoming urban residents
and suffer from discrimination that inhibits
their access to public services. Additionally,
the country’s rapid economic development
has brought wealth and better access to
resources to some urban residents, but it has
left migrant workers without equal access or
fair wages despite their significant participa-
tion in the work force. As a result, China’s
widening distribution gap is generating
social unrest and instability, which is reflect-
ed in recent mass demonstrations. For exam-
ple, when Sun Zhigang, a university-educat-
ed migrant in Guangdong Province, was
beaten to death in March 2003 while in
police custody, the government was forced
to respond by prohibiting the random
detention of migrant workers after a signifi-
cant public outcry.
Under a new pilot program for 11 of its
23 provinces, the Chinese government plans
to remove the legal distinction between rural
and urban residents to promote further eco-
nomic growth in its cities and to address the
widening social and economic gap between
Chinese citizens. Past official announce-
ments and attempts to reform the hukou sys-
tem, however, have not succeeded in
addressing problems of discrimination. As
the UN Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) reported
in May 2005, “The Committee notes with
deep concern the de facto discrimination
against internal migrants in the fields of
employment, social security, health service,
housing, and education that indirectly
result[s], inter alia, from the restrictive
national household registration system
which continues to be in place despite offi-
cial announcements regarding reforms.” 
One crucial problem is the lack of
resources, particularly on the local govern-
ment level, to handle the influx of migrants.
Migrant children’s lack of access to adequate
education is particularly demonstrative of
this problem. Children inherit their parents’
hukou status and, as a result, fall into the
same discriminatory and exclusionary sys-
tem. Prior to 1998, for example, children
without the local hukou status were restrict-
ed from attending local public schools. In
the last two decades, the central government
has shifted responsibility to the local govern-
ment to provide education for its residents
without a corresponding increase in fund-
ing. As a result, public schools are faced with
an additional financial burden, which is
shifted to the migrant families when they
charge students unauthorized fees that their
families often cannot afford. Consequently,
there are at least 1.8 million migrant chil-
dren who are excluded from the country’s
educational system.
Thus, the effects of the hukou system can-
not be rectified by simply eliminating the sys-
tem. Proper monitoring and equal implemen-
tation of the system have to be incorporated
into proposed reforms to address the major
challenges rooted in decades of discrimina-
tion against China’s 760 million rural resi-
dents, who make up approximately 60 per-
cent of the country’s 1.3 billion population.
DELAYED RESPONSES TO THE
EARTHQUAKE IN SOUTH ASIA
On October 8, 2005, an earthquake
measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale struck
Pakistan, Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan.
The earthquake killed more than 80,000
individuals, injured approximately 75,000,
and displaced over three million from their
homes. Because of the frigid Himalayan
winter, there was an urgent need to provide
food, medicine, and shelter to the earth-
quake’s victims to prevent the death toll
from rising and to contain the spread of dis-
ease at the over-crowded emergency camps. 
Kashmir, a disputed territory between
India and Pakistan, was the hardest hit. Much
of Kashmir’s capital, Muzaffarabad, was
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destroyed in the earthquake and rebuilding
has proven difficult. The region poses signifi-
cant logistical challenges because its terrain is
mountainous and landslides have blocked
many of the supply roads. Much of Kashmir’s
communication and electrical infrastructure
were also destroyed, which has added to the
difficulties of delivering aid to the region. To
facilitate a better exchange of goods and the
movement of Kashmiri people, Pakistan’s gov-
ernment has opened the “Line of Control.”
For over 50 years these crossing points in
Kashmir between Pakistan and India have
been closed. Some observers have predicted
that the necessities of the disaster might help
improve relations between these countries.
As emotionally charged images of
Pakistanis suffering and dying spread
throughout the world, Pakistan’s govern-
ment has been criticized for its slow and
delayed response. Critics alleged that
Pakistan’s president and military leader,
Pervez Musharraf, spent six years building
up and financing the country’s military, but
when the earthquake hit, he proved unable
to mobilize the army fast enough to provide
immediate relief. Musharraf ’s government
responded by citing blocked roads and
destroyed infrastructure as the cause for such
delays and contended that people within its
administration and the army were also vic-
tims of the tragedy. 
The international community was also
slow to respond in the first month after the
disaster, which prompted UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan to criticize its “weak and
tardy” response when compared with the
reaction to the Southeast Asian tsunami in
December 2004. Pakistan appealed for $5.2
billion from the international community,
but this amount was not met until after there
was sufficient public disapproval for the
inadequate donations from governments and
international donors. Two weeks after the
earthquake, only approximately 25 percent
of the UN-requested $550 million had been
met. In contrast, 92 countries contributed 99
percent of the UN emergency appeal for the
2004 tsunami. Nonetheless, Pakistan now
has $5.4 billion in pledges, with approxi-
mately $2 million in grants and the remain-
der in loans. The U.S. government, who con-
siders Pakistan an ally in its war against ter-
rorism, was one of the largest donors at $510
million, three times as much as its original
pledge. Even with the pledges met, most of
the money is allocated for long-term recon-
struction. According to UN and other aid
officials, the current relief funds are insuffi-
cient for a six-month emergency operation to
keep survivors alive over the winter.
In mid-December 2005 the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
established additional camps in Kashmir to
close and relocate inadequate camps. An esti-
mated 2.5 million individuals are temporari-
ly housed in tents in the lower regions, while
close to half a million remain in Kashmir’s
higher altitudes, some of whom have not
received any aid at all. Even those who have
found shelter suffer from overcrowded con-
ditions and may not receive adequate servic-
es. More camps are needed to promote prop-
er hygiene and to prevent the spread of dis-
ease, but Kashmir’s rough terrain limits the
amount of available land. The procurement
of the tens of thousands of tents necessary to
protect people is another hurdle to the estab-
lishment of refugee camps. 
In the meantime Pakistan’s government
and the UNHCR have begun to set up camps
in rural areas so that some survivors can be
closer to their villages to rebuild their homes
during the spring. The immediate goal is to
provide warmth and shelter to refugees to sur-
vive the harsh winter conditions. 
For more information on relief efforts,
visit the UNHCR website at
http://www.unhcr.ch, the Kashmir
International Relief Fund website at
http://www.kirf.org/, the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies website at
http://www.ifrc.org/, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross website at
http://www.icrc.org/. HRB
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